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THE FUTURE OF PRICE
DISTORTION IN FEDERAL
SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
JILL E. FISCH*
ABSTRACT
In its recent Halliburton decision, the Supreme Court focused on
the role of price distortion in meeting the requirements for class
certification in private securities fraud litigation. Accepting the
argument that the fraud-on-the-market theory requires fraudulent
information to have an effect on stock price, the Court reasoned that
defendants should therefore be allowed to introduce evidence of lack of
price impact in an effort to defeat class certification. Specifically, the
Court suggested that defendants might introduce event studies as direct
evidence that could sever the link between the misrepresentation and
stock price.
This conclusion, however, misapprehends the event study
methodology. Specifically, the emphasis on event studies is misguided
because the event studies proffered by defendants do not conclusively
establish that the fraud did not distort stock price. More broadly, the
limitations of existing quantitative methods suggest that they should not
be the exclusive way of analyzing price distortion for purposes of class
certification. Instead, the importance of price distortion suggests the
need for greater consideration of materiality because a finding of
materiality is an implicit determination that the information has the
capacity to affect stock price.
INTRODUCTION
When I wrote The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after
1
Halliburton, the Supreme Court had just issued its 2011 Eric P. John
Copyright © 2015 Jill E. Fisch.
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1. Jill E. Fisch, The Trouble with Basic: Price Distortion after Halliburton, 90 WASH. U. L.
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Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton decision (Halliburton I). In Halliburton I,
the Supreme Court decided very little—its cryptic statement that loss
causation and reliance were two separate concepts did not engage
with the key question of whether the antiquated concept of reliance
should continue to form a meaningful component of federal securities
3
fraud jurisprudence. More importantly, as I argued, the Court in
4
Basic Inc. v. Levinson premised its fraud-on-the-market (“FOTM”)
5
presumption on a concept of price distortion that had never been
6
fully articulated. The Court determined that the legal element of
reliance could be presumed on the basis that fraudulent
7
misrepresentations distort securities prices. Subsequent commentary
8
revealed that this concept was problematic.
The Court subsequently decided Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut
9
Retirement Plans and Trust Funds. Amgen offered the Court the
opportunity to consider the relationship between price distortion and
materiality or, more generally, the role price distortion plays in the
FOTM presumption. The Court resisted the temptation, and declined
to reconsider Basic. Rather than engaging in a detailed analysis of the
role of materiality in federal securities fraud litigation, the Court
ruled, on procedural grounds, that plaintiffs were not required to
10
prove materiality at the class-certification stage.
The significance of price distortion was not, however, laid to rest.
After Amgen, the defendants in the Halliburton case renewed their
attempt to defeat class certification on the basis that price distortion,
which they termed price impact, was a critical component of the
11
FOTM presumption of reliance under Basic. In Halliburton II,
2. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 131 S. Ct. 2179 (2011).
3. See id. at 2186 (“The fact that a subsequent loss may have been caused by factors other
than the revelation of a misrepresentation has nothing to do with whether an investor relied on
the misrepresentation in the first place, either directly or presumptively through the fraud-onthe-market theory. Loss causation has no logical connection to the facts necessary to establish
the efficient market predicate to the fraud-on-the-market theory.”).
4. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
5. See id. (adopting the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance).
6. Fisch, supra note 1, at 916 (explaining Basic as adopting a “market-based” approach to
federal securities fraud).
7. Basic, 485 U.S. at 242–43.
8. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 912 (citing criticisms of the Basic decision and its reasoning).
9. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
10. Id. at 1199 (“Because a failure of proof on the issue of materiality, unlike the issues of
market efficiency and publicity, does not give rise to any prospect of individual questions
overwhelming common ones, materiality need not be proved prior to Rule 23(b)(3) class
certification.”).
11. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.
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decided last term, the Supreme Court agreed. Although the Court
rejected the petitioners’ effort to have Basic overruled, the Court
concluded that price impact was a component of the reliance
13
requirement and that defendants could therefore rebut the FOTM
14
presumption by demonstrating the absence of price impact.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning on this point is theoretically
correct. Basic’s presumption of reliance depends upon the fact that
misinformation distorts stock prices and upon the assumption that, in
the absence of fraud, the stock price at which the plaintiffs traded
would have been different from the price at which plaintiffs actually
15
traded. In colloquial terms, the market-based harm identified in
Basic, and for which a FOTM claim provides a remedy, is the harm of
16
trading at a distorted stock price. Put simply, no distortion—no
17
claim.
The challenge posed by defendants’ argument is twofold. First,
price distortion, as I have previously explained, is not the same as
18
price impact. Second, price distortion, although conceptually logical,
is a pragmatically illusive concept. There is no reliable empirical basis
for determining the price at which a security would have traded in a
counterfactual world in which no fraud had occurred. Moreover, the
Court’s suggestion, in Halliburton II, that defendants can use event
19
studies to prove the absence of price impact is not methodologically
sound. The solution is to reject the temptation to allow flawed
empirical methods to dominate the analysis.
Because the empirical methodology is not appropriate, the current
focus on event studies is misguided. Moreover, it is unnecessary.
Federal securities fraud already has a tool for evaluating price impact.
That tool is the element of materiality. A determination that
information has the capacity to affect stock price is implicit in a

(Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317), available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/
wp-content/uploads/2013/10/No.-13-317-Brief-in-Opposition.pdf.
12. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014).
13. Id. at 2416 (“Under Basic’s fraud-on-the-market theory, market efficiency and the
other prerequisites for invoking the presumption constitute an indirect way of showing price
impact.”).
14. Id. at 2417.
15. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 244 (1988).
16. Fisch, supra note 1, at 916.
17. Id. (explaining that a market-based approach results in a measure of damages based on
the amount of price distortion attributable to the fraud).
18. See id. at 923–24.
19. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
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finding of materiality. This essay argues that existing quantitative
methods are inferior to an analysis of materiality. As a result, this
essay argues that the Court’s analysis in Amgen was incorrect and that
materiality rather than reliance should be the focus of the Court’s
inquiry at class certification.
This essay begins in Part I by clarifying the role of price distortion
in fraud on the market and explaining the distinction between price
distortion and price impact. In Part II, the essay explains why an event
study showing that a misrepresentation did not result in a statistically
significant abnormal return does not establish the absence of price
distortion and does not, therefore, rebut the FOTM presumption. Part
III discusses the implications of this analysis. In particular, the essay
concludes that the Basic presumption should be predicated on a
showing of materiality and considers the relationship between that
showing and the concept of price distortion discussed by the Court in
Halliburton II.
I. THE ROLE OF PRICE DISTORTION
In Halliburton II, the Court reiterated the premise upon which
Basic Inc. v. Levinson based its presumption of reliance:
21
misinformation distorts prices in the public capital markets. As the
Court explained, without price impact, there is no reason to presume
class-wide reliance on the misrepresentations by relying on the
market price, because nothing establishes that the misrepresentations
22
were even reflected in that price. The analysis is exactly right. In
Basic, the Court reasoned that fraudulent information distorts
23
security prices. In essence, a security trades at a different price in a
market affected by fraud than in a market in which that fraud is
absent.
Basic’s analysis was somewhat opaque, leaving subsequent courts
24
to struggle with developing the components of fraud on the market.
20. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976) (“[T]o fulfill the materiality requirement ‘there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made available.’”)).
21. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2410 (2014).
22. Id. at 2416.
23. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246 (“Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’
premise that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
available information, and, hence, any material misrepresentations.”).
24. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Basic at Twenty: Rethinking Fraud on the Market,
2009 WIS. L. REV. 151, 161 (describing “confusion” generated by the way the Basic plurality
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First, Basic suggested that its analysis depended critically on market
25
efficiency. This led subsequent courts to devote considerable effort
to evaluating the extent to which the particular market in which a
security traded was sufficiently efficient to justify the Basic
26
presumption. In recent cases, many courts have considered expert
testimony attempting to assess the degree of efficiency in the market
27
for a specific security.
28
This emphasis on market efficiency is a mistake. Markets need
not be efficient for prices to respond to and reflect fraudulent
29
information. Indeed, prices respond to information in most markets,
30
whether or not they can be characterized as efficient. In addition,
Basic’s presumption is based on the response of stock price to a
particular information event—the fraudulent disclosure that is the
subject of the litigation. While the efficiency of the market may
suggest that, as a general matter, prices respond to information, it
does not directly answer the question of whether market price
31
responded to and incorporated the fraudulent disclosure itself.
Similarly, commentators, including the petitioners in Halliburton
II, criticized Basic as inconsistent with modern developments in
32
economics. First, they argued that Basic is undercut because
empirical studies demonstrate that the capital markets are not
fundamentally efficient, meaning that a stock’s trading price is not an
33
accurate reflection of its intrinsic value. Second, they identified the
opinion was written).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
27. See, e.g., In re Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 281 F.R.D. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
McIntire v. China MediaExpress Holdings, Inc., 38 F. Supp. 3d 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).
28. See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae at 4, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014)
(No. 13-317) [hereinafter Brief of Law Professors] (arguing that Basic’s use of market efficiency
to show reliance is a “mistake and counterproductive”).
29. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market
Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 899 (1992) (“[t]he only important question is
whether the price was distorted,” not “determining what is or is not a truly efficient market”).
30. See, e.g., James D. Cox, Fraud on the Market After Amgen, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. &
PUB. POL. 101 (Dec. 11, 2013), available at http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1066&context=djclpp (observing that prices of small cap stocks that
trade in what is generally understood as inefficient markets respond to information); Fisch,
supra note 1, at 913 n.120 (arguing that information affects prices even in markets that are not
efficient).
31. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d Cir. 2005).
32. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioners at 15–16, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13317) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners].
33. See id. (explaining that “overwhelming empirical evidence” now “suggests that capital
markets are not fundamentally efficient”) (quoting Lev & de Villiers, Stock Price Crashes and
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growing body of behavioral economics suggesting that many market
participants—including noise traders and algorithmic traders, for
34
example—do not engage in information-based trading.
With respect to the first critique, it is certainly true that the
concept that market prices reflect fundamental or intrinsic value is
35
highly contested. Indeed, it is unclear that current empirical methods
36
contain a sufficiently robust concept of value to test the proposition.
With respect to the second critique, although noise traders and others
may not trade in response to information developments, information
37
plays a critical role in the decisions of most investors. Hedge funds,
38
for example, exist to uncover and exploit informational advantages.
In addition, although market developments have changed securities
trading from the time of the Basic decision, those developments have
greatly facilitated the capacity of the market to respond to
information. The information environment post-Basic has, through
the use of technology, the internet, and social media, become richer
39
and more responsive.
As a result, the analysis in Halliburton II suggests a conceptually
cleaner evaluation of a FOTM claim in which the critical question
should be whether the fraudulent information affected stock price at
the time at which the plaintiffs traded. Importantly, the requirement
that stock price be distorted, as I have argued elsewhere, is not the
40
same as price impact. There are a variety of circumstances in which
the release of fraudulent information may not have any immediate
effect on stock price even though, in the counterfactual world in

10b-5 Damages: A Legal, Economic and Policy Analysis, 47 STAN. L. REV. 7, 20 (1994)).
34. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 32, at 20.
35. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Markets Can be Wrong and the Price is Not Always Right,
FIN. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2009 (explaining the confusion between information efficiency and
fundamental value efficiency).
36. See James D. Cox, Understanding Causation in Private Securities Lawsuits: Building on
Amgen, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1719, 1728 (2013) (explaining that “there are no reliable models for
determining the ‘correct’ price of a security”).
37. See Brief of Securities Law Scholars as Amici Curiae at 9–10, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct.
2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (describing manner in which information influences investors’ trading
decisions).
38. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Confronting the Circularity Problem In Private Securities
Litigation, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 333, 346–47 (2009) (explaining that some hedge funds are
information-based traders).
39. See, e.g., Heather Traeger & Kris Easter, Use of Social Media in Private Fund
Offerings: Perks, Perils and Privacy, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 143 (2013).
40. Fisch, supra note 1, at 923–24.
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which truthful disclosure is made, the stock price would have been
41
different.
The most common of these circumstances is when a
misrepresentation confirms market expectations or falsely conceals
an adverse change or development. In such a case, the fraudulent
statement is unlikely to generate any market reaction at all.
Nonetheless, the information distorted the stock price because, in the
counterfactual world in which the defendant had disclosed accurately,
the market would have responded to the information conveyed by
42
that disclosure.
43
Basic itself presents such a case. Plaintiffs claimed that Basic lied
44
by falsely denying the existence of merger negotiations. The price of
Basic’s stock, at the time that the plaintiffs traded, was arguably
distorted because the market was unaware of the merger negotiations.
In other words, by falsely denying the existence of the negotiations,
Basic, prevented that information from being incorporated into
market price. Had those negotiations been disclosed, the price of the
stock would arguably have been higher. The plaintiffs were injured
then, in the amount of the difference between Basic’s actual price, and
45
the price at which the stock would have traded absent the fraud.
46
A second example involves multiple or bundled disclosures.
Many, if not most, corporate disclosures involve more than one
discrete piece of information. Each piece of information, if it is
material, is likely to have an effect on stock price. Consider, for
example, an issuer that releases both good news—a promising new
product in development and bad news—its most recent earnings were
below analyst expectations. To the market, the good and bad news
41. See id. at 918–20 (providing examples).
42. See, e.g., In re Pfizer Inc. Sec. Litig., 936 F. Supp. 2d 252, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[A]
misstatement may cause inflation simply by maintaining existing market expectations.”)
(citation omitted); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2010) (explaining that a
public misrepresentation may impact the stock price by causing the price to rise or stopping it
from declining).
43. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
44. Id. at 228.
45. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 917. Justice Blackmun was aware of the potential effect of
Basic’s reasoning on the appropriate calculation of damages, but agreed to defer the issue at the
request of Justice Stevens. See A.C. Pritchard, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. ScientificAtlanta: The Political Economy of Securities Class Action Reform, 2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
217, 221 nn.15 & 16 (citing Harry Blackmun, Conference Notes, Basic v. Levinson, No. 86-279
(Nov. 4, 1987) (Harry A. Blackmun Collection, Library of Congress) & Letter from Harry A.
Blackmun to William J. Brennan, Jr., No. 86-279, Basic v. Levinson (Jan. 15, 1988)).
46. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 919–20.
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may cancel each other out, resulting in no direct impact on stock
price. Now imagine that the news about the promising new product is
false. Had that information not been coupled with the earnings
release, the stock price would have fallen. Thus the trading price was
distorted by the fraudulent disclosure, but the statement did not have
a price impact.
Importantly, the price distortion at the core of fraud on the
market focuses on whether stock price distorted at the time that the
plaintiff trades. I have described this elsewhere as ex ante price
47
distortion. Whether the stock price responds when the fraud is
revealed to the market is a distinct question, which I have termed ex
48
post price distortion. Ex ante and ex post price distortion are related,
49
but not equivalent concepts. The original fraudulent statement and
the corrective disclosure in securities fraud litigation can occur
months apart. During that period of time, both market and firmspecific developments can affect the significance of a given factual
50
statement so as to increase or decrease its effect on stock price. As a
result, the reaction of the stock price to the corrective disclosure does
not necessarily indicate the degree to which the original statement
51
affected the stock price.
52
Consider again, the example of Basic. Assume that, as was the
case, on October 21, 1977, Basic falsely denied that it was engaged in
53
merger negotiations. On December 20, 1978, Basic and Combustion
54
Engineering announced that they had signed a merger agreement.
Imagine that, the next day, Basic announced that it had, in fact, been
engaged in merger negotiations since before October 21, 1977, and
47. See id. at 924.
48. Id.
49. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 32, at 51 (equating analysis of price impact for
purposes of loss causation and at class certification). The petitioners had previously argued to
the Court that the analysis was the same—an argument that the Court rejected in Halliburton I.
See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).
50. See, e.g., Patrick J. Coughlin et al., What’s Brewing in Dura v. Broudo? The Plaintiffs’
Attorneys Review the Supreme Court’s Opinion and Its Import for Securities-Fraud Litigation, 37
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2005) (explaining how defendants can, through prior disclosures, “walk
down” the stock price so as to minimize the price impact of a negative corrective disclosure).
51. See, e.g., Frederick C. Dunbar & Arun Sen, Counterfactual Keys to Causation and
Damages in Shareholder Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 199, 1214 (“In some
circumstances it is possible that a timely disclosure would have been material—that is, would
have caused a measurable price drop—while the untimely disclosure does not cause a price drop
due to changes in economic conditions.”).
52. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988).
53. Id. at 228 n.4.
54. See id. (reporting Basic’s public announcement of the merger agreement).
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that its prior denial of such negotiations was false. It is highly unlikely
that this announcement would affect the stock price—the existence of
prior merger negotiations was rendered irrelevant to Basic’s stock
55
price by the subsequent announcement of the merger.
Similarly, the price impact of a corrective disclosure may be
56
greater than the amount of the original price distortion. Among
other things, the corrective disclosure reveals not just the falsity of the
prior statement but questions about management integrity or internal
57
controls. The market may view those questions as more significant
than the misstatement itself. The corrective disclosure may also reveal
the potential for subsequent litigation, leading the market to reflect
58
that litigation risk in its price reaction.
Thus the presence of price impact at the time of a corrective
disclosure—loss causation—does not establish that stock price was
distorted at the time of the fraud. For the same reason, an event study
that fails to establish loss causation does not prove that the original
misstatement did not affect the stock price. As the Court’s opinion in
Halliburton I correctly concluded, ex ante and ex post price distortion
59
are conceptually distinct.
II. EVENT STUDIES AND PRICE DISTORTION
The Court’s first step in Halliburton II was to recognize and
60
clarify the centrality of price distortion in a FOTM claim. The Court
went on to hold that defendants could disprove price distortion at the
61
class certification stage. As indicated above, this analysis is
conceptually sound because price distortion is fundamental to the
FOTM presumption. Where the Court went astray is in its discussion
62
of the role of the event study in the analysis of price distortion.
55. Critics might argue that the merger announcement itself constituted Basic’s corrective
disclosure, but of course the fact that the two companies eventually merged would not, by itself,
disclose that Basic’s previous denial was, at the time it was made, false.
56. See also Barbara Black, Reputational Damages in Securities Litigation, 35 J. CORP. L.
169, 173 (2009) (suggesting that the market may “overreact” to a corrective disclosure as the
result of a “disproportionate reaction to bad news”).
57. See, e.g., Dunbar & Sen, supra note 51 at 231 (terming such losses “collateral
damage”).
58. Id.
59. See Halliburton I, 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2186 (2011).
60. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2416 (2014) (“Price impact is thus an essential
precondition for any Rule 10b–5 class action.”).
61. Id. at 2417.
62. I have discussed elsewhere other limitations on the reliability of event studies in
securities fraud litigation. See Fisch, supra note 1, at 919–20.
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Specifically, the Court erred in concluding that, in the standard event
study, a finding of no statistical significance proves the absence of
price distortion, thereby rebutting the Basic Inc. v. Levinson
63
presumption.
The Court was presented, in Halliburton II, with an amicus brief
from two law professors who argued that an event study was “the best
64
available tool” to evaluate price distortion. The brief argued that
event studies could be used to show if a misrepresentation had an
effect on stock price or to establish the absence of a statistically
significant effect. The professors explained that, if an event study
showed no statistically significant effect, “the market cannot be said
65
to have relied on the misrepresentation.”
The Supreme Court bought the argument. After the Justices
questioned the advocates at oral argument extensively about the
66
nature of an event study, the Halliburton II opinion described an
event study as direct evidence capable of “show[ing] no price impact
67
with respect to the specific misrepresentation challenged in the suit.”
This statement reflects a fundamental misperception of the event
study methodology. The standard event study used in securities
litigation only shows the absence of a statistically significant price
impact, not the absence of price impact. The difference is critical.
An event study analyzes the relationship between a specific
event—in this case, the release of fraudulent information—and stock
68
price. The type of event study used in securities fraud litigation tests
for a relationship between a disclosure—the event—and stock price
69
by testing for the existence of an abnormal return. An abnormal
return is one that cannot be explained by the “normal” fluctuations in
70
the issuer’s stock price or by movements of the market as a whole. If
63. Id. at 2415 (describing the introduction of an event study demonstrating “that the
evidence shows no price impact with respect to the specific misrepresentation challenged in the
suit.”).
64. Brief of Law Professors, supra note 28, at 24.
65. Id. at 26.
66. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19–24, Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct 2398 (No. 13-317).
67. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2415.
68. See generally Jonathan Klick & Robert Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and
Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 796 (2008)
(describing event study methodology).
69. See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling
Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183
(2009) (providing simplified description of the event study methodology used in securities fraud
litigation).
70. See, e.g., Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 68, at 801 (describing concept of abnormal
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the issuer’s stock price during the event window is sufficiently outside
the range that would be predicted by its normal volatility and market
forces, the abnormal return is said to be statistically significant. The
standard test for statistical significance defines a firm’s normal return
as the range within which the firm’s returns will fall 95% of the time
71
in the absence of any significant occurrence. A return outside that
normal range is termed a statistically significant abnormal return.
Critically, information can affect stock price to a lesser degree
than will be detected by an event study. In such a case, the event study
fails to find statistical significance, which means that the event study
cannot determine whether the information had a price effect or not.
The study does not prove that there is no price effect; it merely shows
72
that the evidence is equally consistent with the null hypothesis.
Similarly, an event study can show an abnormal return—that is, a
return outside the expected range—even in a situation in which there
has been no information event. Such abnormal returns are statistically
possible, but rare, like a string of ten coin tosses that all come up
heads.
The likelihood of finding a statistically significant return increases
with the economic importance of the information to the issuer. It
decreases, however, for more volatile issuers because the range of
normal returns is greater. The validity of the event study also depends
on an appropriate choice of event window or the time period during
which the market is expected to respond to the news. Finally, use of
event studies in securities fraud litigation is subject to additional
methodological concerns such as the validity of assuming a normal
distribution of returns when calculating the effect of a small number
73
of events on the price of a single firm’s stock.
Even in a case in which an event study reveals a statistically
significant abnormal return, the result can be due to the presence of
74
confounding information such as other company-specific news.
return).
71. See, e.g., Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J.
CORP. L. 159, 162 (2009) (explaining concept of statistical significance).
72. It is possible to construct an event study that proves that information did not impact
stock price. The demands of such a study are far more rigorous, however, and it is unlikely that
defendants would be able to construct such a study on the facts of a case that has generated the
filing of a complaint.
73. See Jonah B. Gelbach, Eric Helland & Jonathan Klick, Valid Inference in Single-Firm,
Single-Event Studies, 15 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 495 (2013).
74. See, e.g., David Tabak & Frederick Dunbar, Materiality and Magnitude: Event Studies
in the Courtroom (NERA Working Paper No. 34, Apr. 1999), available at
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Experts generally address this problem by estimating the extent to
which the stock price would normally respond to the other
75
information. This procedure, however, assumes that discrete
information events affect stock price independently, an assumption
that may not be warranted.
The limitations of the event study magnify the importance of the
76
burden of proof in Halliburton II. If the Court had required the
plaintiffs to prove price distortion, they would be unable, using an
event study, to demonstrate a statistically significant price impact in
many cases in which the price would likely have been different in the
absence of the fraud. If, on the other hand, the burden is on the
defendant, as the foregoing analysis suggests, defendants will rarely be
able to meet this burden. If the event study is properly understood,
77
Halliburton II is not a significant gain for prospective defendants.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION
The foregoing discussion illustrates why the Halliburton II Court’s
decision to accept the law professors’ invitation and focus on event
studies was misguided. The event study methodology, contrary to the
Court’s suggestion, does not provide a reliable way of determining
whether misrepresentations distorted stock price. If, however, the
Court was correct in identifying price distortion as critically important
to fraud on the market, how should it evaluate the existence of price
distortion for purposes of class certification?
This essay suggests that the first step should be an analysis of
materiality. As the Supreme Court explained, information is material
78
if it is significant to the trading decision of a reasonable investor.
Because market prices are a function of investors’ decisions whether
to trade and at what price, information that is significant to the
trading decision is information that has the capacity to affect stock
http://ssrn.com/abstract=166408.
75. Id.
76. See Halliburton II, 134 S.Ct. 2398, 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (observing that the
“Court recognizes that it is incumbent upon the defendant to show the absence of price
impact”).
77. See id. (explaining that the decision should “should impose no heavy toll on securitiesfraud plaintiffs with tenable claims”).
78. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). The Court has elsewhere
distinguished the concept of significance in the definition of materiality from the technical
concept of statistical significance. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309,
1319, 1321 (2011) (concluding that “statistical significance (or the lack thereof) . . . is not
dispositive” of the issue of materiality).
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prices. Accordingly, it is appropriate to presume price distortion, for
purposes of class certification, upon a showing of materiality.
Concededly, the ever-expanding disclosure requirements of the
federal securities laws offer reason to question the assumption that all
material information has the capacity to affect stock prices. Recent
80
disclosure obligations imposed by the Dodd-Frank Act, for example,
require issuers to disclose information about their use of conflict
minerals and their resource extraction policies under circumstances in
81
which the information seems extremely unlikely to affect stock price.
This observation suggests a need to reexamine the scope of what
disclosures are considered material. At the same time, however, it may
be difficult to predict the economic significance of a particular
disclosure. One well-known economic study, for example, finds that
the stock price of companies that disclose the fact that their CEOs use
company aircraft for personal use underperform their benchmarks by
82
four percent. The study implies that failure to disclose such use
would be a material omission.
This reasoning necessarily raises the question of how materiality
should be litigated and, specifically, whether courts should analyze the
results of event studies in determining whether the plaintiff has met
its burden. The federal courts have developed an extensive
jurisprudence developing the concept of materiality that, for the most
part, does not rely on event studies demonstrating a connection
83
between the information and stock price.
Nonetheless, it is possible, consistent with efficient market
hypothesis, for market prices to under- or over-react to information in
any given case, in much the same way that individual participants in a
transaction may overlook or ignore the significance of material

79. See also Fisch, supra note 1, at 902–03.
80. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§
78m(p) and 78m(q) (West 2015).
81. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. SEC, 748 F.3d 359, 365 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (discussing the
SEC’s failure to provide a de minimis exemption from the conflict minerals disclosure
requirement).
82. David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and Inferior
Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 213 (2006).
83. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A
Proposal for Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 749, 767 (2007); Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon,
Confronting the Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a
Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557, 596 (2015).
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information. The fact that information is material means that it has
the capacity to affect stock prices, but does not ensure that it will do
85
so. The Halliburton II Court was therefore correct in concluding that
defendants should have the opportunity to rebut a presumption of
price distortion by introducing evidence that the stock price was not
distorted.
Toward that end, defendants should have the opportunity to
introduce economic evidence, including event studies showing no
statistically significant price effect as well as event studies suggesting
that the information may have been introduced into the market at a
different time or discounted by investors. That evidence, however,
should be given appropriate weight; that is, it is relevant to, but not
determinative of price distortion.
The focus of the inquiry, under Basic Inc. v. Levinson, should not
be whether the misrepresentation moved the stock price but whether,
in the absence of the fraud, the plaintiff would have traded at a
different price. Because of the limitations of event studies, that
assessment should also consider the extent to which the subject
matter of the misrepresentation was considered by institutional
investors, whether the type of information was reflected in the
financial media and analyst reports, the manner in which prices
typically react to similar information, and the total mix of information
86
at the time of the disclosure. Evidence of these factors is clearly
87
relevant in evaluating the existence and extent of price distortion.
Importantly, Halliburton II does not forestall the need for a
complex analysis of price distortion because, at the end of the day,
plaintiffs will need to prove price distortion in order to establish
damages. In so doing, plaintiffs and courts will have to confront both

84. See Langevoort, supra note 24 (discussing In re Merck & Co. Securities Litigation and
other cases).
85. The Merck case arguably presents an example of a material statement that did not
affect stock price at the time it was made. See In re Merck & Co. Sec. Litig., 432 F.3d 261 (3d
Cir. 2005). See also In re Sadia, 269 F.R.D. 298, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (describing argument that,
over a period of time, the price impact of a material statement could vary).
86. See, e.g., Aranaz v. Catalyst Pharm. Partners, 302 F.R.D. 657, 670–71 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(seeking to introduce evidence that price was not distorted by alleged misrepresentations
because the market knew the truth); IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc., No.
11-429, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108409, at *16–17 (D. Minn. Aug. 6, 2014) (attempting to
demonstrate that market price responded to statements other than the alleged
misrepresentations).
87. Cf. Aranaz, 302 F.R.D. at 670–71; IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108409 at *16–17 (rejecting introduction of such evidence at class certification).

FISCH FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/23/2015 2:58 PM

FUTURE OF PRICE DISTORTION IN FEDERAL SECURITIES FRAUD LITIGATION

101

the limitations of market efficiency and difficult policy questions
about the extent to which damages should reflect noise and/or
88
irrational market reactions to inaccurate disclosures.
Whether this inquiry takes place at class certification or not is a
separate issue. Several recent decisions have rejected defendants’
efforts to rebut the existence of price distortion at class certification,
holding that, in light of Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans
and Trust Funds, the evidence could not be raised until summary
89
judgment. These decisions are consistent with Justice Ginsburg’s
statement in Halliburton II, suggesting that the decision is not
intended to open the door to an extensive inquiry at the class
90
certification stage. Because of the complexity of this analysis, and the
fact that materiality is a common inquiry for all members of the
91
plaintiff class, it may not be appropriate for the courts to weigh the
evidence on materiality at the class certification stage.
On the other hand, a trial court recently denied certification to a
class of investors in In re BP P.L.C. Securities Litigation on the basis
that plaintiffs had failed to show that damages could be reliably
92
measured on a class-wide basis. The BP court borrowed from the
Supreme Court’s Comcast Corp. v. Behrend decision, in which the
Court denied class certification holding that Rule 23 of Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure requires a “rigorous analysis” of whether Rule 23’s
93
requirements are satisfied. In Comcast, the Court denied class
certification because it found that “respondents’ model falls far short
of establishing that damages are capable of measurement on a class94
wide basis.”
The BP court subsequently retreated somewhat from its initial
95
approach. After plaintiffs provided additional information about the
88. See also Matrixx Initiatives Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309, 1319 (2011) (reporting
dramatic stock price reaction to “anecdotal” evidence of adverse product effects).
89. See, e.g., Aranaz, 302 F.R.D. 657 at 671; IBEW Local 98 Pension Fund, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 108409 at *19–20.
90. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2417 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
91. Materiality is a common inquiry because the legal standard is an objective one, that of
the reasonable investor. See Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184,
1196 (2013).
92. See In re BP P.L.C. Secs. Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173303, at
*73–75 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 6, 2013) (citing Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013)).
93. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (citing Wal–Mart Stores, Inc.
v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541 (2011)).
94. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433.
95. See generally In re BP P.L.C. Sec. Litig., No. 10-md-2185, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69900
(S.D. Tex. May 20, 2014).
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method of calculating damages including the creation of several
subclasses, the court granted class certification for some of the
subclasses noting that “approximating damages . . . is an imperfect
science,” but concluding that imperfections in plaintiffs’ proffered
methodology were not sufficient to warrant denial of class
96
certification.
It is unclear whether other courts will undergo the detailed
analysis of the BP court at the class-certification stage. Moreover,
securities-fraud litigation may be different from the antitrust and
employment discrimination cases that have established many of the
operative rules about the class-certification inquiry. As the drafters of
Rule 23 observed, public capital markets securities fraud litigation is
distinctive in that the public market itself supplies a degree of
commonality to securities transactions that is different from other
97
substantive areas. Similarly the small stakes of many members of the
plaintiff class make the need for class-wide litigation particularly
acute.
Halliburton II adds force to the argument that securities fraud
litigation is distinctive by considering the affirmative role of Congress
in responding to concerns about potential litigation abuse and
adopting particularized procedures to limit the potential for such
98
abuse. At the same time, the Basic decision raised important
99
questions about the appropriate measure of the plaintiffs’ harm,
questions that have not been adequately addressed by either courts or
100
commentators and with which the BP court attempted to grapple.
Regardless of the outcome of the damage question, however, the
Basic presumption requires only the existence of price distortion, not
a precise methodology for quantifying the amount of that distortion.

96. Id. at *81.
97. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Civil Procedure Scholars Supporting Respondent at 11,
Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014) (No. 13-317) (explaining that Rule 23 was adopted to
facilitate securities fraud class actions).
98. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2413 (2014) (identifying the role of Congress in
addressing policy considerations about the appropriate scope of securities fraud class actions);
see also Jill Fisch, Federal Securities Fraud Litigation as a Lawmaking Partnership, __ WASH. U.
L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2015).
99. See, e.g., Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 (2011).
100. See Fisch, supra note 1.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision closed the door on defendants’
efforts to have Basic Inc. v. Levinson’s adoption of the FOTM
presumption of reliance in securities-fraud litigation overruled. At the
same time, however, the decision opened the door to an inquiry, at the
class-certification stage, over the extent to which defendants’
fraudulent conduct affected the stock price. The Court’s decision
invited defendants to introduce evidence of lack of price impact, in
the form of event studies, in order to rebut the Basic presumption.
Defendants, in recent cases, have responded to that invitation,
offering event studies purporting to show the failure of market price
to move in response to the alleged misrepresentation, the subsequent
101
corrective disclosure, or both.
Although the issue of price distortion is a critical component of
the Basic presumption, the Court in Halliburton II misunderstood the
role of event studies in analyzing the issue. The event studies offered
to rebut the FOTM presumption do not provide a reliable way of
establishing the absence of price distortion. As a result, this essay
criticizes the role for event studies created by Halliburton II. Instead,
this essay argues that the class-certification inquiry should more
properly focus on materiality. Specifically, a showing of materiality
should entitle the plaintiffs to a presumption of price distortion
sufficient to meet the requirements of Basic.
A careful analysis of price distortion suggests that measuring the
extent to which misinformation has distorted stock prices is a complex
inquiry, and this inquiry is both unnecessary and inappropriate at the
class-certification stage. Nonetheless, because price distortion is, under
fraud on the market, the true measure of the plaintiffs’ economic
harm, a further consideration of the policy considerations that
underlie the calculation of plaintiffs’ damages is warranted.

101. See, e.g., Lawrence T. Gresser and Patrick M. Connorton, Traversing the Post‘Halliburton’ Landscape, N.Y. L.J. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/
home/id=1202714342794?back=&slreturn=20150027120719 (discussing recent challenges); see
also Defendants’ Brief on Price Impact, The Erica P. John Fund v. Halliburton, 2015 WL
4522863 (N.D. Tex. July 25, 2015) (No. 3:02-CV-1152-M); Defendants’ Memorandum of Law In
Support of the Denial of Class Certification, Local 703 v. Regions Fin. Corp., 2014 WL 6661918
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2014) (No. 2:10-cv-02847-IP).

